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Abstract
This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm
under price uncertainty when the firm is not only risk averse but also regret averse.
Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a modified utility function that in-
cludes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. The extent
of regret depends on the difference between the actual profit and the maximum
profit attained by making the optimal production and hedging decisions had the
firm observed the true realization of the random output price. While the separa-
tion theorem holds under regret aversion, the prevalence of hedging opportunities
may have perverse effect on the firm’s optimal output level, particularly when the
firm is sufficiently regret averse. The full-hedging theorem, however, does not hold.
We derive sufficient conditions under which the regret-averse firm’s optimal futures
position is an under-hedge (over-hedge). We further show that the firm optimally
increases (decreases) its futures position when the price risk possesses more positive
(negative) skewness.
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1. Introduction
The seminal work of Sandmo (1971) has inspired a large body of research on the theory
of the competitive firm under price uncertainty. One important strand of this literature
examines the behavior of the firm when a futures market exists for hedging purposes, from
which two celebrated theorems emanate (see, e.g., Broll and Zilcha, 1992; Danthine, 1978;
Feder et al., 1980; Holthausen, 1979; to name just a few). First, the separation theorem
states that the firm’s optimal output level depends neither on the risk attitude of the firm,
nor on the incidence of the price uncertainty. Second, the full-hedging theorem asserts that
the firm should fully hedge its exposure to the price risk if the futures market is unbiased.1
Most of the extant models in the literature assume that the firm’s preferences admit
the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation. Such a modeling
approach rules out the possibility that the firm may have desires to avoid consequences
wherein ex-post suboptimal decisions appear to have been made even though these decisions
are ex-ante optimal based on the information available at that time. To account for this
consideration, Bell (1982, 1983) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) propose regret theory that
defines regret as the disutility arising from not having chosen the ex-post optimal alternative,
which is later axiomatized by Quiggin (1994) and Sugden (1993). Regret theory is supported
by a large body of experimental literature that documents regret-averse preferences among
individuals (see, e.g., Loomes, 1988; Loomes et al., 1992; Loomes and Sugden, 1987; Starmer
and Sugden, 1993).
In this paper, we incorporate regret theory into the competitive firm that is allowed
to hedge the price risk by trading futures. Specifically, we characterize the firm’s regret-
averse preferences by a modified utility function that includes disutility from having chosen
ex-post suboptimal alternatives.2 The extent of regret depends on the difference between
1The full-hedging theorem is analogous to a well-known result in the insurance literature that a risk-averse
individual fully insures at an actuarially fair price (Mossin, 1968).
2For other applications of regret aversion using a similar modified utility function, see Braun and Muer-
mann (2004) and Wong (2012) in the case of demand for insurance, Muermann et al. (2006) in a portfolio
choice problem, Tsai (2012) and Wong (2011) in the banking context, and Broll et al. (2015, 2016) in the
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the actual profit and the maximum profit attained by making the optimal production and
hedging decisions had the firm observed the true realization of the random output price. We
are particularly interested in examining the robustness of the separation and full-hedging
theorems when regret aversion prevails.
We show that the separation theorem holds in that the firm can sell its output forward
by trading futures so as to lock in the marginal revenue at the predetermined futures price.
However, the prevalence of hedging opportunities may not have the usual output-enhancing
effect under regret aversion, contrary to what the conventional wisdom suggests. We show
that the regret-averse firm optimally produces more when it is banned from trading futures
for hedging purposes if regret aversion plays a sufficiently more important role than risk
aversion in determining the firm’s production decision. The full-hedging theorem does not
hold. We derive sufficient conditions under which the regret-averse firm optimally opts
for an under-hedge (over-hedge). These are in stark contrast to the findings of Guo et
al. (2015) and Michenaud and Solnik (2008), both of which show that the optimal futures
position under regret aversion and an unbiased futures market is an under-hedge. Guo et
al. (2015) assume that the firm cannot trade futures had the firm observed the true output
price, whereas Michenaud and Solnik (2008) assume that the firm can opt for neither a long
futures position nor an over-hedge. These assumptions are unduly strong. We adopt a more
realistic assumption that there are position limits for long and short futures positions due
to margin requirements and other liquidity reasons, which accounts for the more general
findings in our setting. Finally, we show that the firm optimally increases (decreases) its
futures position when the price risk possesses more positive (negative) skewness.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the model of the
competitive firm under price uncertainty when the firm’s preferences exhibit not only risk
aversion but also regret aversion. Section 3 examines the firm’s optimal production decision.
Section 4 examines the firm’s optimal hedging decision. The final section concludes.
decision to export.
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2. The model
Consider the competitive firm under price uncertainty à la Sandmo (1971). There is one
period with two dates, 0 and 1. To begin, the firm produces a single commodity according
to a deterministic cost function, C(Q), where Q ≥ 0 is the output level, and C(Q) is
compounded to date 1 with the properties that C(0) = C ′(0) = 0, and C ′(Q) > 0 and
C ′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0.3 The firm sells its entire output, Q, at the per-unit price, P̃ , at
date 1.4 The firm regards P̃ as a positive random variable that is distributed according to
a known cumulative distribution function, F (P ), over support [P , P ], where 0 < P < P .
To hedge the price risk, P̃ , the firm can trade infinitely divisible futures contracts at
date 0. Each futures contract calls for delivery of one unit of the commodity at date 1 at
the predetermined futures price, P f ∈ (P , P ). Let H be the number of the futures contracts
sold (purchased if negative) by the firm at date 0. The firm is subject to position limits in
that its short futures position cannot exceed S and its long futures position cannot exceed
L due to margin requirements and other liquidity reasons, where S > 0 and L > 0 are
exogenously given short and long position limits, respectively.5 The futures position, H,
is said to be an under-hedge, a full-hedge, or an over-hedge, depending on whether H is
smaller than, equal to, or greater than the output level, Q, respectively. We assume that
the position limits, S and L, are large enough that the firm can opt for an under-hedge,
a full-hedge, or an over-hedge at the optimum.6 The firm’s profit at date 1 is, therefore,
given by
Π(P ) = PQ− C(Q) + (P f − P )H, (1)
for all P ∈ [P , P ], subject to the constraint that the short and long position limits do not
3The strict convexity of the cost function reflects the fact that the firm’s production technology exhibits
decreasing returns to scale.
4Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
5The short and long position limits are not only realistic features of a futures market, but also necessary
for prohibiting the firm from taking an infinite short (long) futures position should the firm be perfectly
informed that the true realization of the random output price is below (above) the predetermined futures
price.
6This assumption requires that S > Q∗, where Q∗ solves C′(Q∗) = P f . See Proposition 1.
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bind, i.e., −L < H < S.
Following Braun and Muermann (2004) and Wong (2014), we assume that the firm’s
preferences are represented by the following bivariate utility function (Paroush and Venezia,
1979):
V (Π, R) = U(Π)− βG(R), (2)
where β > 0 is a constant regret coefficient, U(Π) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function with U ′(Π) > 0 and U ′′(Π) < 0 for all Π > 0, and G(R) is a regret function defined
over the magnitude of regret, R, such that G(0) = 0, and G′(R) > 0 and G′′(R) > 0 for
all R > 0.7 The magnitude of regret, R = Πmax − Π, is gauged by the difference between
the actual profit, Π, and the maximum profit, Πmax, that the firm could have earned at
date 1 should the firm have made the optimal production and hedging decisions based on
knowing the true per-unit price, P . Since Π cannot exceed Πmax, the firm experiences
disutility from forgoing the possibility of undertaking the ex-post optimal production and
hedging decisions. As the constant regret coefficient, β, increases, regret aversion becomes
increasingly more important in representing the firm’s preferences as compared to risk
aversion.
To characterize the regret-averse firm’s optimal production and hedging decisions, we
have to first determine the maximum profit, Πmax. If the firm could have observed the
realized per-unit price, P , the maximum profit would be achieved by choosing Q(P ) that
solves C ′
(
Q(P )
)
= P and H = S if P < P f and H = −L if P > P f . Note that
Q′(P ) = 1/C ′′
(
Q(P )
)
> 0. The maximum profit as a function of P is given by
Πmax(P ) = PQ(P )− C
(
Q(P )
)
+ max[(P f − P )S, (P − P f )L], (3)
for all P ∈ [P , P ]. The magnitude of regret, R(P ), is given by
R(P ) = Πmax(P )−Π(P ), (4)
7Bleichrodt et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence that regret functions are indeed convex.
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for all P ∈ [P , P ], where Π(P ) and Πmax(P ) are given by Eqs. (1) and (3), respectively.
We can now state the regret-averse firm’s ex-ante decision problem. At date 0, the firm
chooses an output level, Q, and a futures position, H, so as to maximize the expected value
of its regret-theoretical utility function:
max
Q≥0, H
E
[
U
(
Π(P̃ )
)
− βG
(
R(P̃ )
)]
, (5)
where R(P ) is given by Eq. (4), and E[·] is the expectation operator with respect to F (P ).
The first-order conditions for program (5) are given by
E
[[
U ′
(
Π∗(P̃ )
)
+ βG′
(
R∗(P̃ )
)]
[P̃ − C ′(Q∗)]
]
= 0, (6)
and
E
[[
U ′
(
Π∗(P̃ )
)
+ βG′
(
R∗(P̃ )
)]
(P f − P̃ )
]
= 0, (7)
where an asterisk (∗) indicates an optimal level. The second-order conditions for program
(5) are assumed to be satisfied.
3. Optimal production decision
In this section, we examine the firm’s optimal production decision. To this end, we add
Eq. (6) to Eq. (7) to yield
E
[
U ′
(
Π∗(P̃ )
)
+ βG′
(
R∗(P̃ )
)]
[P f − C ′(Q∗)] = 0. (8)
Given that U ′(Π) > 0, Eq. (8) reduces to C ′(Q∗) = P f , thereby invoking our first proposi-
tion.
Proposition 1. Given that the regret-averse competitive firm can trade the futures con-
tracts for hedging purposes, the firm’s optimal output level, Q∗, is the one at which the
marginal cost of production, C ′(Q∗), is equated to the predetermined futures price, P f .
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The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. By producing one more unit of the com-
modity, the firm receives the marginal revenue, P̃ , which is stochastic. The firm can sell
this additional unit forward via trading one futures contract to lock in the marginal rev-
enue at P f . At the optimum, the firm equates the marginal revenue, P f , to the marginal
cost, C ′(Q∗). This then gives rise to the usual optimality condition, C ′(Q∗) = P f , that
determines the optimal output level, Q∗.
An immediate implication of Proposition 1 is that the firm’s optimal production decision
depends neither on its attitude towards risk and regret, nor on the underlying uncertainty.
Proposition 1 as such extends the separation theorem to the case in which the firm is regret
averse.
While Proposition 1 shows that the separation theorem holds under regret aversion, it
is completely silent about how the prevalence of hedging opportunities affects the regret-
averse firm’s optimal output level. To address this issue, we consider a benchmark case
wherein the firm is banned from trading the futures contracts for hedging purposes. In this
benchmark case without hedging, the firm’s optimal output level, Q◦, is the solution to the
following first-order condition:
E
[[
U ′
(
Π◦0(P̃ )
)
+ βG′
(
R◦0(P̃ )
)]
[P̃ − C ′(Q◦)]
]
= 0, (9)
where Π◦0(P ) = PQ
◦ − C(Q◦) and R◦0(P ) = PQ(P ) − C
(
Q(P )
)
− PQ◦ + C(Q◦) for all
P ∈ [P , P ].
To have a fair comparison, we assume that the predetermined futures price, P f , is set
equal to the expected value of P̃ , i.e., P f = E[P̃ ]. To compare Q∗ with Q◦, we evaluate the
left-hand side of Eq. (9) at Q = Q∗ to yield
E
[[
U ′
(
Π∗0(P̃ )
)
+ βG′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)]
[P̃ − C ′(Q∗)]
]
= Cov
[
U ′
(
Π∗0(P̃ )
)
+ βG′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)
, P̃
]
, (10)
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where Π∗0(P ) = PQ
∗ − C(Q∗) and R∗0(P ) = PQ(P ) − C
(
Q(P )
)
− PQ∗ + C(Q∗) for all
P ∈ [P , P ], Cov[·, ·] is the covariance operator with respect to F (P ), and the equality
follows from the property of the covariance operator and Proposition 1.8 It then follows
from Eqs. (9) and (10) that Q∗ > (<) Q◦ if, and only if, the right-hand side of Eq. (10) is
negative (positive).
When β = 0, the right-hand side of Eq. (10) reduces to Cov
[
U ′
(
Π∗0(P̃ )
)
, P̃
]
< 0, where
the inequality follows from U ′′(Π) < 0 and Π∗
′
0 (P ) = Q
∗ > 0. Hence, we have Q◦ < Q∗
when β = 0, which is the well-known result that the firm, being risk-averse, produces less
than Q∗ so as to limit its exposure to the price uncertainty (Sandmo, 1971). In the following
proposition, we show that for β sufficiently small, introducing regret aversion to the firm
would not substantially alter such a risk-reducing incentive so that Q◦ < Q∗.
Proposition 2. Given that U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(R) ≥ 0, the regret-averse competitive firm
optimally produces less when it is banned from trading the futures contracts for hedging
purposes, i.e., Q◦ < Q∗, if the constant regret coefficient, β, is sufficiently small such that
β ≤
U ′
(
Π∗0(P
f )
)
− U ′
(
Π∗0(P )
)
G′
(
R∗0(P )
)
−G′(0)
. (11)
Proof. Since Π∗0(P
f ) < Π∗0(P ) and U
′′(Π) < 0, we have U ′
(
Π∗0(P
f )
)
> U ′
(
Π∗0(P )
)
.
Likewise, R∗0(P ) > 0 and G
′′(R) > 0 imply that G′
(
R∗0(P )
)
> G′(0). Hence, the threshold
of β in condition (11) is strictly positive. Let Φ(P ) = U ′
(
Π∗0(P )
)
+βG′
(
R∗0(P )
)
. Then, we
have
Cov
[
U ′
(
Π∗0(P̃ )
)
+ βG′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)
, P̃
]
= E
[
[Φ(P̃ )− Φ(P f )](P̃ − P f )
]
. (12)
Differentiating Φ(P ) twice with respect to P yields
Φ′(P ) = U ′′
(
Π∗0(P )
)
Q∗ + βG′′
(
R∗0(P )
)
[Q(P )−Q∗], (13)
8For any two random variables, X̃ and Ỹ , we have Cov[X̃, Ỹ ] = E[X̃Ỹ ]−E[X̃]E[Ỹ ]. Proposition 1 implies
that C′(Q∗) = P f = E[P̃ ].
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and
Φ′′(P ) = U ′′′
(
Π∗0(P )
)
Q∗2 + βG′′′
(
R∗0(P )
)
[Q(P )−Q∗]2 + βG′′
(
R∗0(P )
)
Q′(P ). (14)
Since U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0, G′′(R) > 0, G′′′(R) ≥ 0, and Q′(P ) > 0, Eq. (14) implies that Φ′′(P ) > 0
for all P ∈ [P , P ]. Since Q∗ = Q(P f ) and Q′(P ) > 0, we have Q(P ) < (>) Q∗ for
all P < (>) P f . It follows from Eq. (13) that Φ′(P ) < 0 for all P ∈ [P , P f ]. Hence,
Φ(P ) > Φ(P f ) for all P ∈ [P , P f ]. Since Φ(P f ) = U ′
(
Π∗0(P
f )
)
+ βG′(0), condition (11)
ensures that Φ(P f ) ≥ Φ(P ). Since Φ(P ) is strictly convex in P and Φ′(P f ) < 0, it follows
from condition (11) that Φ(P ) < Φ(P f ) for all P ∈ (P f , P ). The right-hand side of Eq.
(12) as such is negative so that Q∗ > Q◦. 2
Proposition 2 shows that the conventional wisdom under which the prevalence of hedging
opportunities is output enhancing is valid if regret aversion is relatively unimportant as
compared to risk aversion in determining the firm’s optimal output level, i.e., β is sufficiently
small. This suggests that the prevalence of hedging opportunities may give rise to perverse
output effect, particularly when regret aversion becomes the dominant factor of the firm’s
production decision, i.e., β is sufficiently large. We show in the following proposition that
it is indeed the case.
Proposition 3. Given that U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(R) ≥ 0, the regret-averse competitive firm
optimally produces more when it is banned from trading the futures contracts for hedging
purposes, i.e., Q◦ > Q∗, if E
[
G′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)]
> G′
(
R∗0(P )
)
and the constant regret coefficient,
β, is sufficiently large such that
β ≥
U ′
(
Π∗0(P )
)
− E
[
U ′
(
Π∗0(P̃ )
)]
E
[
G′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)]
−G′
(
R∗0(P )
) . (15)
Proof. Since Π∗0(P ) < Π
∗
0(P ) for all P ∈ (P , P ] and U ′′(Π) < 0, we have U ′
(
Π∗0(P )
)
>
E
[
U ′
(
Π∗0(P̃ )
)]
. If E
[
G′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)]
> G′
(
R∗0(P )
)
, the threshold of β in condition (15) is
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strictly positive. Since E[Φ(P̃ )] = E
[
U ′
(
Π∗0(P̃ )
)]
+ βE
[
G′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)]
, E
[
G′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)]
>
G′
(
R∗0(P )
)
and condition (15) ensure that E[Φ(P̃ )] ≥ Φ(P ). Since Φ(P ) is strictly convex
in P and Φ′(P ) < 0 for all P ∈ [P , P f ], it must be true that E[Φ(P̃ )] < Φ(P ). Hence,
there must exist a unique point, P ∗ ∈ (P f , P ), at which Φ(P ∗) = E[Φ(P̃ )] such that
Φ(P ) < E[Φ(P̃ )] for all P ∈ (P , P ∗) and Φ(P ) > E[Φ(P̃ )] for all P ∈ (P ∗, P ]. Then, we
have
Cov
[
U ′
(
Π∗0(P̃ )
)
+ βG′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)
, P̃
]
= E
[
{Φ(P̃ )− E[Φ(P̃ )]}(P̃ − P ∗)
]
> 0, (16)
which implies that Q∗ < Q◦. 2
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. Since G′
(
R∗0(P )
)
is U-shaped and reaches
a unique minimum at P = P f , there must exist a unique point, P ◦ ∈ (P f , P ), such
that G′
(
R∗0(P
◦)
)
= E
[
G′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)]
if E
[
G′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)]
> G′
(
R∗0(P )
)
. Hence, we have
G′
(
R∗0(P )
)
< E
[
G′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)]
for all P ∈ [P , P ◦) and G′
(
R∗0(P )
)
> E
[
G′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)]
for
all P ∈ (P ◦, P ], which imply that
Cov
[
G′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)
, P̃
]
= E
[{
G′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)
− E
[
G′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)]}
(P̃ − P ◦)
]
> 0. (17)
When the firm is risk neutral, i.e., U(Π) = Π, the right-hand side of Eq. (10) reduces
to Cov
[
G′
(
R∗0(P̃ )
)
, P̃
]
, which is positive from Eq. (17). As such, the firm, being purely
regret averse, has more concerns about the disutility from the discrepancy of its output
level, Q(P ) − Q∗, when high realizations of P̃ are revealed. To minimize regret, the firm
optimally adjusts its output level upward from Q∗ so that Q◦ > Q∗. Since the firm is
in fact risk averse, there is a countervailing incentive that induces the firm to reduce its
output level. Condition (15) ensures that the firm is sufficiently regret averse, i.e., β is
sufficiently large, in that the incentive driven by regret aversion dominates the opposing
incentive driven by risk aversion, thereby inducing the firm to optimally produce more if it
is banned from trading the futures contracts for hedging purposes.
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4. Optimal hedging decision
In this section, we examine the firm’s optimal hedging decision. To focus on the firm’s
hedging motive, we assume that the futures contracts are unbiased in that the predetermined
futures price, P f , is set equal to the expected value of P̃ , i.e., P f = E[P̃ ]. In this case, Eq.
(7) becomes
Cov
[
U ′
(
Π∗(P̃ )
)
+ βG′
(
R∗(P̃ )
)
, P̃
]
= 0. (18)
Since covariances can be interpreted as marginal variances, Eq. (18) simply says that the
optimal futures position, H∗, is the one at which the variability of the firm’s marginal utility
under regret aversion is minimized.
Evaluating the left-hand side of Eq. (18) at H = Q∗ yields
Cov
[
G′
(
Πmax(P̃ )−Π∗(P f )
)
, P̃
]
. (19)
It then follows from Eq. (7) and the second-order conditions for program (5) that H∗ <
(>) Q∗ if, and only if, the covariance term is positive (negative). We state and prove the
following proposition.
Proposition 4. The competitive firm, being regret averse, optimally opts for an under-
hedge, i.e., H∗ < Q∗, or an over-hedge, i.e., H∗ > Q∗, depending on whether
E
[
G′
(
Πmax(P̃ )−Π∗(P f )
)]
≥ G′
(
Πmax(P )−Π∗(P f )
)
, (20)
or
E
[
G′
(
Πmax(P̃ )−Π∗(P f )
)]
≥ G′
(
Πmax(P )−Π∗(P f )
)
, (21)
respectively.
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Proof. Differentiating G′
(
Πmax(P )−Π∗(P f )
)
with respect to P yields
∂
∂P
G′
(
Πmax(P )−Π∗(P f )
)
= G′′
(
Πmax(P )−Π∗(P f )
)[
Q(P )− SI{P<P f} + LI{P>P f}
]
, (22)
where I{A} is an indicator function that takes on a value equal to unity if event A occurs
and zero otherwise. Since S ≥ Q∗ > Q(P ) for all P ∈ [P , P f ) and G′′(Πmax − Π) > 0, it
follows from Eq. (22) that G′
(
Πmax(P ) − Π∗(P f )
)
is decreasing (increasing) in P for all
P < (>) P f . Hence, G′
(
Πmax(P ) − Π∗(P f )
)
is U-shaped and reaches a unique minimum
at P = P f . If condition (20) holds, there must exist a unique per-unit price, P ◦ ∈ (P f , P ),
such that
G′
(
Πmax(P ◦)−Π∗(P f )
)
= E
[
G′
(
Πmax(P̃ )−Π∗(P f )
)]
. (23)
Then, we have
Cov
[
G′
(
Πmax(P̃ )−Π∗(P f )
)
, P̃
]
= E
[[
G′
(
Πmax(P̃ )−Π∗(P f )
)
−G′
(
Πmax(P ◦)−Π∗(P f )
)]
(P̃ − P ◦)
]
. (24)
Given that G′
(
Πmax(P ) − Π∗(P f )
)
is U-shaped, condition (20) and Eq. (23) imply that
the right-hand side of Eq. (24) is positive, thereby rendering that H∗ < Q∗. The proof that
H∗ > Q∗ given condition (21) can be done analogously and thus is omitted. 2
The intuition for Proposition 4 is as follows. If condition (20) holds, it follows from Eq.
(24) thatG′
(
Πmax(P̃ )−Π∗(P f )
)
is positively correlated with P̃ , thereby inducing the regret-
averse firm to raise more concerns about the disutility from the discrepancy of its futures
position, Q∗, from the long position limit, L, when high realizations of P̃ are revealed.
To minimize regret, the firm optimally adjusts its futures position downward from Q∗ so
that H∗ < Q∗. On the other hand, if condition (21) holds, then G′
(
Πmax(P̃ ) − Π∗(P f )
)
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is negatively correlated with P̃ . The regret-averse firm as such raises more concerns about
the disutility from the discrepancy of its futures position, Q∗, from the short position limit,
S, when low realizations of P̃ are revealed. To minimize regret, the firm optimally adjusts
its futures position upward from Q∗ so that H∗ > Q∗.
Finally, we examine the marginal effect of price risk on the firm’s optimal hedging
decision. To this end, we let F̂ (P ) be a new CDF of P̃ . The following definition is adopted
from the definition of downside risk à la Menezes et al. (1980).9
Definition 1. The CDF, F̂ (P ), is said to have more simple positive (negative) skewness
than the CDF, F (P ), if, and only if,
∫ P
P
[F̂ (P )− F (P )]dP = 0, (25)
∫ P
P
{∫ P
P
[F̂ (x)− F (x)]dx
}
dP = 0, (26)
∫ P
P
[F̂ (x)− F (x)]dx ≤ (≥) 0 for all P ≤ P f , (27)
∫ P
P
[F̂ (x)− F (x)]dx ≥ (≤) 0 for all P ≥ P f , (28)
and
∫ P
P
{∫ x
P
[F̂ (y)− F (y)]dy
}
dx ≤ (≥) 0 for all P ∈ [P , P ]. (29)
Eq. (25) ensures that P̃ has the same mean under F (P ) and F̂ (P ). Eq. (26) ensures
that P̃ has the same variance, denoted by σ2, under F (P ) and F̂ (P ). Eq. (29) ensures that
P̃ has more positive (negative) skewness under F̂ (P ) than under F (P ), while Eqs. (27) and
9An increase in downside risk in the sense of Menezes et al. (1980) is simply a third-degree increase in
risk in the sense of Ekern (1980).
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(28) ensure a single-crossing property. To see this, we compare the central third moment
under F̂ (P ) and that under F (P ):
∫ P
P
(
P − P f
σ
)3
d[F̂ (P )− F (P )]
=
6
σ3
∫ P
P
(P − P f )
{∫ P
P
[F̂ (x)− F (x)]dx
}
dP
=
6
σ3
∫ P
P
(P − P f )
{∫ P
P
[F̂ (x)− F (x)]dx
}
dP
= − 6
σ3
∫ P
P
{∫ P
P
{∫ x
P
[F̂ (y)− F (y)]dy
}
dx
}
dP, (30)
where the first equality follows from integration by parts and Eq. (25), the second equality
follows from Eq. (26), and the last equality follows from integration by parts and Eq. (26).
If F̂ (P ) has more simple positive (negative) skewness than F (P ), the right-hand side of Eq.
(30) is positive (negative) so that the third central moment under F̂ (P ) is indeed larger
(smaller) than that under F (P ).
Since P̃ has the same mean under F (P ) and F̂ (P ) from Eq. (25), the firm’s optimal
output level remains Q∗ when the original CDF, F (P ), is replaced by the new CDF, F̂ (P ).
The firm’s optimal futures position, H†, is the solution to the following first-order condition:
∫ P
P
[
U ′
(
Π†(P )
)
+ βG′
(
Πmax(P )−Π†(P )
)]
(P f − P )dF̂ (P ) = 0, (31)
where a dagger (†) signifies an optimal level. To compare H† with H∗, we evaluate the
left-hand side of Eq. (31) at H∗ to yield
∫ P
P
[
U ′
(
Π∗(P )
)
+ βG′
(
Πmax(P )−Π∗(P )
)]
(P f − P )dF̂ (P )
=
∫ P
P
[
U ′
(
Π∗(P )
)
+ βG′
(
Πmax(P )−Π∗(P )
)]
(P f − P )d[F̂ (P )− F (P )], (32)
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where the equality follows from Eq. (7). It then follows from Eq. (31) that H† > (<) H∗
if, and only if, the right-hand side of Eq. (32) is positive (negative). We state and prove
the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Given that U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(Πmax − Π) ≥ 0, the regret-averse compet-
itive firm increases (decreases) its optimal futures position, i.e., H† > (<) H∗, when the
CDF of the uncertain per-unit price, P̃ , shifts from F (P ) to F̂ (P ), where F̂ (P ) has more
simple positive (negative) skewness than F (P ).
Proof. Let Φ(P ) =
[
U ′
(
Π∗(P )
)
+ βG′
(
Πmax(P ) − Π∗(P )
)]
(P f − P ). Then, we have
Φ′′(P ) = Ψ(P )− 2U ′′
(
Π∗(P )
)
(Q∗ −H∗), where
Ψ(P ) = U ′′′
(
Π∗(P )
)
(Q∗ −H∗)2(P f − P )
+βG′′′
(
Πmax(P )−Π∗(P )
)][
Q(P )− SI{P<P f} + LI{P>P f}
]2
(P f − P )
+βG′′
(
Πmax(P )−Π∗(P )
)]
(P f − P )Q′(P )
−2βG′′
(
Πmax(P )−Π∗(P )
)][
Q(P )− SI{P<P f} + LI{P>P f}
]
. (33)
Since Q(P ) < (>) Q∗ whenever P < (>) P f and Q′(P ) > 0, Eq. (33) implies that
Ψ(P ) > (<) 0 whenever P < (>) P ∗. Using Φ(P ), we can write the right-hand side of Eq.
(32) as
∫ P
P
Φ(P )d[F̂ (P )− F (P )]
=
∫ P
P
[
Ψ(P )− 2U ′′
(
Π∗(P )
)
(Q∗ −H∗)
]{ ∫ P
P
[F̂ (x)− F (x)]dx
}
dP
=
∫ P
P
Ψ(P )
{∫ P
P
[F̂ (x)− F (x)]dx
}
dP
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+2(Q∗ −H∗)2
∫ P
P
U ′′′
(
Π∗(P )
){∫ P
P
{∫ x
P
[F̂ (y)− F (y)]dy
}
dx
}
dP, (34)
where the first equality follows from integration by parts and Eq. (25), and the second
equality follows from integration by parts and Eq. (26). Since Ψ(P ) > (<) 0 whenever
P < (>) P f , Eqs. (27) and (28) imply that the first term on the right-hand side of Eq.
(34) is negative (positive). Eq. (29) implies that the second term on the right-hand side
of Eq. (34) is also negative (positive). Hence, we conclude that H† < (>) H∗ if F̂ (P ) has
more simple positive (negative) skewness than F (P ). 2
The intuition for Proposition 5 is as follows. When F̂ (P ) has more simple positive
skewness than F (P ), realizations of P̃ close to P are much less likely to be seen than those
close to P . The regret-averse firm as such raises more concerns about the disutility from
the discrepancy of its futures position, H∗, from the long position limit, L, when high
realizations of P̃ are revealed. To minimize regret, the regret-averse firm optimally adjusts
its futures position downward from H∗. Prudence, i.e., U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0, further reinforces the
firm’s preferences for positive skewness and thus H† < H∗. On the other hand, when F̂ (P )
has more simple negative skewness than F (P ), realizations of P̃ close to P are much more
likely to be seen than those close to P . The regret-averse firm as such optimally adjusts
its futures positive upward from H∗ to reduce the discrepancy of its futures position, H∗,
from the short position limit, S, when low per-unit prices are revealed. Prudence implies
that the firm would like to minimize its exposure to negative skewness and thus H† > H∗.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we incorporate regret theory into Sandmo’s (1971) model of the competi-
tive firm under price uncertainty. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a modified
utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives.
The extent of regret depends on the difference between the actual profit and the maximum
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profit attained by making the optimal production and hedging decisions had the firm ob-
served the true realization of the random output price. While the separation theorem holds
under regret aversion, the prevalence of hedging opportunities may have perverse effect on
the firm’s optimal output level, contrary to what the conventional wisdom would suggest.
We show that the regret-averse firm optimally produces more when it is banned from trad-
ing futures for hedging purposes if regret aversion plays a sufficiently more important role
than risk aversion in determining the firm’s production decision. We derive sufficient con-
ditions under which the regret-averse firm optimally opts for an under-hedge (over-hedge).
We further show that the firm optimally increases (decreases) its futures position when
the price risk possesses more positive (negative) skewness. Regret aversion as such plays a
distinctive role, vis-à-vis risk aversion, in shaping the production and hedging decisions of
the competitive firm under price uncertainty.
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